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Abstract
The nature of governance has differed widely across societies, and what is more
interesting, within any particular society depending upon the stage of development.
Governance is better defined in functional rather than in value terms. Functional
governance aids and abetts industrialisation. Industrialisation  is the one change
that all societies have to necessarily strive for. Without it  no development is
possible In contemporary societies which are also democratic and trying hard to
industrialise, that insight needs to be tempered with the limitations of the state that
is  a coalition of many classes.
More importantly just because functional governance was not the good governance
of today, in many countries and societies in  the past, does not mean, that it today
cannot be both good and functional.  The point though is that unless it is functional
it can never be good. Functionality of governance is best assured when the policies
followed by the state in its drive to industrialise the economy are correct.  Therefore
the main lesson from history is that the first thing to do (for both functional
governance and for the industrial transformation) is to bring about the initial
conditions necessary for the industrialisation of the economy. The key bottleneck
here is tenurial relations in land which stand in the way of output increases from the
poor farmer. The egalitarian income distribution that land reform brings, ensures
that nearly all the poor are particpants in the market. All other conditions necessary
for the  unambigous transformation  already obtain today in India.
We also describe the process of change and the sense in which the economic is
primary to societal change. That does not mean that there is no scope for individual
or collective action. It only means that there are particular ways in which individuals
and small groups including reformers can bring about change. It is important to
recognise the specific ways in which small groups including elements with
government can bring about change.  In any discussion of corruption and
governance the case of China which despite being highly corrupt society grows can
hardly be avoided. Corruption there is the means by which a bourgeois society is
being born in China today. Because much of the rents are invested there is no
dysfunctionality to this corruption. It would though soon become dysfunctional,
since, once the party elite have all become capitalists, the gain to them and to
society as a whole is greater in a non-corrupt society. That is already happening,
and corruption can be expected to decline soon.Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No. 2001/10/02, Sebastian Morris) 2
STATES, GOVERNANCE AND INDUSTRIALISATION: A HISTORICAL
REVIEW
State, Class and Governance
States have an existence apart from that of governments and their role is
best conceptualised as the management of the economy and society within
the constraints imposed by the coalition of classes that constitute any
society.
The states and institutions in England during the industrial revolution, if one
goes by the stories of the poor houses, the poor laws, the treatment of
children and petty criminals, were hardly fair or moral, even by the
standards of the society then. But they were functional (or at least not
dysfunctional) in the sense of not having stood in the way of the first
transformation- that forever changed society
2. Hence states and institutions
may be distinguished on the lines of whether or not they aided the process
of transformation of society into an industrial society. Thus we distinguish
between a governance that is functional in the sense of aiding and abetting
the industrial transformation; and dysfunctional governance in that the
state in their behaviour, rules and institutions delayed or indefinitely
postponed the industrialisation. Rather than economic performance per se,
it s useful to think of industrial transformation as the goal of all non-
industrial societies.
The Western Industrialisations
The late eighteenth century state in France and its institutions were
dysfunctional to the emergence of capitalism in France and gave way in the
French Revolution to make possible the development of bourgeois society.
While the 'unfairness' of that pre-revolutionary state and society is quite
obvious, that was not its weakness. Its basis in the dysfunctional class (the
aristocracy and the landed gentry) and its feudal form were the barriers to
change which therefore was violently displaced by a revolution for a new
society to emerge. But unlike in England where an unchallenged
bourgeoisie reigned, the French had to create or at least strengthen a
vastly weaker bourgeoisie. It was only with the modernisation of Napoleon
Bonaparte that bourgeois development (industrialisation via capitalist
                                       
2 These may served to secure the right to private property of the  bourgeoisie
against the propertyless is quite clear. In a slightly earlier period, the
bourgeoisie had won the right to property against lords and rulers with political
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development) could be put on an irreversible if slow footing. The travails of
the second Napoleon show that the state had to play a new role - that of
balancing the interest of not only the various sections of the bourgeoisie
but also between classes. This was so because in France, the rising
bourgeoisie had to share the space of the state with both an upper section
of the working classes, rich farmers, remnants of the old ruling classes and
a vast bureaucracy. The coalition state in France unlike in Germany, a little
later under Bismarck, was only able to bring about a much slower
transformation of the economy than in Germany.
In Germany industrialisation began in earnest when its elite landed
interests - the Junkers - turned themselves into capitalists With a state that
had its power base in the merchants and the landlord turned capitalists its
tasks were not contested. Germany therefore transformed very quickly. In
America, without the baggage of a feudalism, the beginnings of
industrialisation required, as a first condition, the overthrow of the British to
form a large market for the benefit of American industry. The simple
mechanisms of common tariffs and public investments in areas of market
failure - standards, technical education, support for local production of arms
and ammunition were used. But it is only with the victory of the North in
the Civil War that bourgeois development can be said to have reached a
point of irreversibility. One of the important issues in the Civil War was
slavery which was declared illegal. But it was the right of the Union to have
a common tariff to which the Southern agrarian interests were opposed,
that was the real underlying issue. For the North however it was important
that the American home market for manufacturers of the North remained
one. The freedom of slaves as the visible issue allowed the North to seize
the moral high ground and strike at the South.
The Dysfunctional State in Brazil
Governance in a narrow or moral sense may well have been no worse in
countries like Brazil than in the US in the early days of industrialisation. But
here without cleansing the state of the Latifundia (the landed interest),
Brazil could not pursue clear policies to abet the industrial transformation,
and therefore the governance of the state may be said to have been
dysfunctional. The issue of fairness is in this context entirely secondary.
Conceivably in a state that is a coalition of various classes, chaos, and civil
war (which may appear as 'governance failure), that lead to ridding the
state of the older classes which stand in the way of bourgeoisIndian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No. 2001/10/02, Sebastian Morris) 4




The Soviet system collapsed as an organisation and ideology completely,
and no organised ('controlled') transformation to the market economy was
possible, because every moment of confusion and anarchy only reduced the
prospects of any such orderly transition. Having stayed long in that
disorganised state the 'mafia' that is today organising production, markets
and firms, cannot be seen as entirely dysfunctional even if their particular
actions are abhorrent. The only system that can in itself emerge out of the
present chaos without great leadership and central organisation is the
'capitalist', with all its dirty aspects. And the 'mafia' play a positive if violent
role in that birth.
PRAXIS IN SOCIETY
Technology as the Ultimate Driver
Here our task is to define the phrase 'leverage points of change'. The
'Weberian' notion of a different protestant ethic being the 'spark' that
brought about the industrial revolution was an attempt to dilute the large
effect that Marx's analyses of history and technology as the determinants of
change, had on academia and politics. This materialist explanation of
society and societal change (the primacy of the forces of production and
the constraints in the relation of production) very quickly spread among
anthropologists, sociologists and economists in so many forms and ways
that its essential origin in Marx is generally forgotten or goes
unacknowledged. In so far as the economic base of the society under study
is the first stage in our analysis the primacy of the economic is repeatedly
acknowledged. The 'problem' with Marx though has been the application of
this great insight into the specific capitalist society of the day, that led him
to predict the demise of capitalist society. That prediction might well be
true when considered at the world level and over a long period. Over a
particular society and over a meaningful time span of a few generations,
these have proven false. Yet the method remains essentially correct.
Indeed in Volume III of Capital, Marx was led to an understanding that
                                       
3 Thus the brutal Syngman Rhee's regime in South Korea got rid of the landed
interests, including rich peasants form the power base, and virtually eliminated
the left wing to create a state that was just right for industrialisation in the
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would have reversed his earlier conclusion of the inevitable fall of capitalist
society based on the analysis in Volume I of Capital.
System, Small Groups and the Individual
The contradiction between Weber and Marx may not be as deep as is
assumed to be. (The same cannot be said of scholars like McClelland and
McGregor who followed Weber in recent times). If indeed we see the
protestant ethic as working through the elite to create the politics and the
appropriate state for bringing about the development of bourgeois society,
the changes in the culture of the masses can and would still operate
through the economic. The point of the marxist analyses though was not to
focus on the 'spark' (or the mutation to use a biological analogy) per se,
but on the process of change, (or the process of selection). Presumably if
'sparks' are numerous enough, then they do not constitute the barrier for
transformation as much as the very working of the economy; hence of the
`importance of the system over that of the individual'. This means that
durable societal change cannot result unless individuals and small groups
work on the economic, and on the political, that can change the basis of
the economic. Thus change has its roots in the political, and it becomes
necessary for reforms to understand the essential political basis of their
proposals. This does not mean that existing political constraints are to be
accepted as given constraints. The art is really to recognise those which
can be changed quickly, (where there is a political opportunity), and others
which are more difficult, and would have to be avoided a while until
economy matures. Thus, a politics, today in India and in similarly situated
societies, which can ensure a clean and good governance of the already
transformed societies is wishful thinking. On the other hand a politics which
can bring about land reform is possible with much effort, and advocacy but
not immediately. While the politics that can lead to direct subsidisation and
to the reform of many sectors like electricity, petroleum, fertilizer, water,
irrigation, and the second stage of reform is an opportunity waiting to be
exploited.
The Economic and Society
How does change take place in society? We had already mentioned that the
ultimate engine of social change is technology, and the 'state' its tool; or, in
the long run, its ineffective opposer.  Governance as an aspect of the state
is therefore important once the state system appropriate for the change has
already been forged through political action, and prior social and political
movements, that may have included revolution. For all societies not as yet
developed, development is the social change without which most others areIndian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No. 2001/10/02, Sebastian Morris) 6
'meaningless'. (Simple living and high thinking for more than small groups
would remain an inaccessible ideal). Cultural autonomy or political
freedoms are not possible without the economic freedom and the
independence that comes with development.
4 Similarly, intellectual and
cultural achievements of the society as a whole remain patchy and
disarticulated from society, (when without development)
5. And for nearly all
large societies (except perhaps those as superbly endowed with natural
resources as Iraq or Saudi Arabia) development necessarily means
industrialisation. For the bulk of the population attitudinal change (an
aspect of culture) follows this economic change, not the other way round.
For smaller groups though, they could successfully stand beyond the
economic constraints and imagine and live a world very different from their
immediate surroundings to 'liberate' themselves. Thus, small groups have
always existed that have believed in and practised freedom to men and
women equally. Yet, for society as a whole to have this attitude required
over a hundred years of bourgeois society and two world wars that brought
women out of their homes, and into factories, offices and battlefields.
Similarly, the few children family, the practice of birth control, or the so
called second demographic transition have happened only as incomes have
gone up to increase the value of women's time. Widespread education, and
the development of powerful medicines have today no doubt brought down
that income level when this transition occurs.
Industrial Transformation is The Change
The beginnings of the transformation lie in certain political and economic
conditions - a state so constituted as to be able to pursue bourgeois
development; and in late industrialising densely populated economies,
additionally, the carrying out of land reforms of the Type II variety of
Ronald Dore
6. Such land reforms in relaxing the agricultural constraint is
                                       
4 This is not to ignore that the process of economic transition may itself
demand a break with certain aspects of the past and its culture, when they
could stand in the way.
5 Great art though may be essentially unconstrained. It may even derive a
certain impetus from the intensely emotional social experience that poverty,
inequality, and great suffering can engender. The audience for such art
nevertheless remains thin and confined to the elite. The audience could
though, in future generations, encompass the society as a whole. The works of
Leskov, Gogol, Vallathol, and Premchand come to mind.
6 In Dore's categorisation, Type I eliminates over lordship on land, but does
not necessarily result in land to the cultivator, or in security of tenure to the
actual cultivator. Type II necessarily involves the latter. This categorisation is
particularly relevant for densely populated economies attempting to make their
(late) industrial transformation. Japan had carried out Type I with the Meiji
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able to allow agriculture to grow rapidly, and for the home market for
manufactures to grow very rapidly, and not run into demand constraints.
Land reform in bringing those with the land and security of tenure
(endowments) into the market both as producers and as consumers speed
up capitalist development. In East Asia land reform was the basis of the
expansion of the home market. Therein the detailed management of public
services and institutional arrangements for infrastructure evolved, and was
refined because of the enormous pressure for change that high-speed
growth brought about. Indeed, a decade or so high growth as currently
being experienced by China or Vietnam today creates sufficient 'vested'
interests to ensure its continuation so that growth may well be self
reinforcing (politically) when at high levels.
Land Reforms in Densely Populated Countries
It is true that Type II land reforms in ensuring security of tenure to the
cultivator of the land is an 'institutional change'
7; but then, to so define land
reforms is to rob it of its political and historical content. The institutional
school conceptualised institutions in apolitical terms, as problems of design
and right incentives. They did not go far enough to include politics and
struggle that alter the ways of economic organisation, management and
organisation, and principally of the character of the state - the ultimate
organiser. And as such their position remains problematic, and does not tie
up with the historical experience of either early or late industrialisers. The
'ultimate force' of change in society as a whole remains technology and
technical change, and certainly been so since the First Industrial
Revolution. Particular societies and regimes though could hold back the
forces unleashed by new technology within and elsewhere for a while, but
soon enough would have had to allow their unfolding; or be destroyed. And
                                                                                                       
occupation under McArthur. circa 1948. Because of Type I, Japan could
industrialise, but still at relatively low levels of income per head, slower growth,
and with large need for migration (to China, Manchuria, and Brazil). With Type
II, 'rapid economic growth' followed in Japan in the fifties and sixties. India too
has carried out Type I, almost immediately after independence. Type II is still
awaited (except in Kerala and Bengal). In areas of semi-feudalism Bihar,
Orrisa, Assam, Madhya Pradesh, Eastern Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, large
parts of other states, agricultural growth can be very rapid if Type II (even of
the security of tenure variety of Operation Barga) is carried out. In other states
where land is not a major constraint, and irrigation supplies can expand
Gujarat, Punjab, Western Uttar Pradesh, parts of Southern India, land reform is
not critical. It is reasonable that Bengal's agriculture which had lagged other
states right upto 1982-83,  the time of Operation Barga, grew very rapidly
thereafter at an average rate close to 6% per annum!
7 Some of the empirical difficulties of the institutionalist position are brought
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this is true as long as it is the economy that provides the bulk of the needs
of people.
8 Yet, for a meaningful length of time like a generation or two,
and perhaps even longer, these 'forces of production' can be held back by
the lack of the proper initial conditions, changing which is usually a political
process, often through the state. They could also be held back by an
improperly constituted state, even when the state has the correct
orientation. They could still be held back by 'improper or incorrect'
economic policy. The institutions required for growth and development can
come along with the transformation. And states can always create and alter
them, and also bring about appropriate macro-economic policy to result in
economic dynamism. They can also functionally shape institutions in ways
not imagined by their original creators or designers. An improperly
constituted state or society that lacks the ideal conditions for late
industrialisation can fail despite institutions.
Varieties of Actions
Does the understanding that durable society wide change follows economic
changes, mean that there is no scope for action? Not at all. There is always
the scope for action in bringing about revolutions - which changes the
power equations in class society and the character of the state. When the
state is essentially functional to the task ahead, and the economic is held
back by particular vested interests, or archaic institutions, these can be
neutralised or corrected to release the economic, even if such changes
would "anyway have happened". Similarly, actions, that speed up economic
change which in turn creates the conditions for society at large to change,
are potent. Thus, correct fiscal and monetary policy, but so also industrial
policies become leverage points for change in such societies. In other
words, economic policies have effects which go beyond the static,
(narrowly) allocative and x-efficiency gains. Sustainability, and release of
more potent forces of economic and social change (i.e. positive feedback
effects) are other important aspects.
Working Through the Economic
Cultural or attitudinal change among small groups including sections of the
elite could sometimes be the very starting points of change. Because they
in turn through revolutions, or through the levers of the state and the
economy can bring about change in the economic, and so in the culture
and behaviour of the masses. Thus the individual and the small group has
autonomy in this vital sense. And it is important to realise this. Thus,
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attempts to preach equality of women among the masses of a largely non-
urbanised still pre-industrial society would be doomed to failure. So would
merely asking or 'educating' petroleum dealers in India to control
corruption
9. Similarly, attempting to train public sector managers to be
entrepreneurial without changing the organisational situation would be
fruitless
10. Working for change among the elite and those who control the
levers of change, to bring about change in the economic or in the `whole'
is therefore part of the praxis. Individual public enterprise managers who
are entrepreneurial, or a few dealers who does not adulterate would always
be there. But policy makers and the state are concerned with the system or
the society as whole, and hence the constraints and opportunities in the
economic ought to be at the focus of their attention. A change in
governance over a part of government, which creates the changes
necessary in the economy, can be potent when the process by which the
economy works are deeply understood. On the other hand to expect a
change in governance in the government as a whole through mere
administrative fiat is imaginary
11. Certainly, key governance changes in
crucial aspects or functions of the government as in the legal system, or in
the management of public enterprise, in the authority that carries out
disinvestment, can bring about the release of economic forces, to bring
durable and vast changes elsewhere, including in governance in the rest of
the system. Such governance changes in key aspects of government would
have to arise out of the political
12, or great administrative imagination and
leadership.
CORRUPTION IN CHINA
From Party to Bourgeoisie
                                       
9 For a discussion of the economic and policy basis for the governance failure
in oil marketing see Box 2.
10 The insistence on such training can in the more confident manager create a
permanent haitus between theory and practice and the practise is essentially
intractable in any systematice sense  Among the not so confident, it only
results in an unwarranted sense of inadequacy.
11 They can through major political change and through revolution, typically the
latter. If General Park Hee's or Lee Kuan Yew's vision created modern South
Korea and Singapore respectively, then prior social and political changes were
their foundations.
12 The tragedy today in India, is that even in the limited spheres where there is
political commitment (as in electricity reforms), the vested interests, and
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The comparison and contrast of corruption in India with China is important.
Corruption today (or rather yesterday) in China is no less than it is in India.
Indeed, we may succinctly describe China's process of growth and evolution
into a capitalist society since 1979 as one uninterrupted orgy of corruption
in which party functionaries (who were both the executive and the
bureaucracy) exploited their political power, their power over economic
decisions and control over state owned enterprise. The latter happened
especially after the managers in SOEs were allowed profit shares. Thus, the
near complete egalitarian (in an economic sense) society of Mao has now
evolved into a society with some inequality. The transformation of the party
elite (and even lower rungs) into a bourgeoisie is, from the vantage point of
its functionality to the industrial transformation, akin to the 'junkers' turning
capitalists in Germany in the 1860s after several years of the Zollverein. So
an entire bourgeoisie is being created out of the party members, but
especially its elite. Besides corruption, per se another aspect in the
accumulation has been the round haul of Chinese capital via Hong Kong,
Taiwan, Singapore and the US (via 'non resident chinese many of whom are
relatives of party officials), that mistakenly gets reported as FDI into
China.
13
What goes on today cannot be described as `primitive accumulation' per
se. The phase of 'primitive accumulation' of Marx, in China was (under
'socialism') during the period up to the mid-seventies but especially during
the Great Leap Forward. And this accumulation fits the idea of 'primitive
socialist accumulation' of Preobrazensky. In Russia that phase was in the
twenties and thirties. Unfortunately for Russia, it actually went ahead with
creating a 'socialist' society. The Second World War by its appeal to Russian
nationalism prevented the contradictions of the `socialist' thirties from
being fully exposed, and the Cold War that followed only increased the
resolve of the state and party to not question its basic assumption of a
transformation without markets. The phase in China from 1979 to date can
be called as one of re-emergence of capitalism and markets on the sound
basis (of endowments for all) provided by nearly thirty years of
communism
14. The market had not been completely destroyed under
communism (unlike in Russia), and the first of the liberalisations was of
agriculture. Therefore consolidation of the market mechanism was not at
the cost of the poor. Indeed, the consolidation of private property in the
                                       
13 It is known that about 80 to 85 % of Chinese FDI (average US $ 40b in the
late nineties) are Chinese investments from these countries.
14 The Cultural Revolution, may have been a set back in more ways than, one
since it took attention away from the task of accumulation. It may have also
have made China critically short  of certail skills like managers and bankers that
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first phase was that of peasants which was followed by that of lower rungs
of the party who set up petty businesses, and then that of the elite sections
who then went on through big corruption to accumulate capital. In simple
language "power and money cannot be divorced for too long". Similar
processes came about very early, with independence, in many of the
African countries variously described as bureaucratic, kleptocratic or state
capitalism (Mamdani, 1976; Shivji, 1976; Leys, 1975). In India too at the
state level through mechanisms such as the joint sector and surpluses from
agriculture and rents from the state, a local bourgeoisie has emerged.
Thus, capitalism world over shows 'corruption' as an integral aspect when
the bourgeoisie emerges. To the extent that the Indian bourgeoisie
(however stunted) has had an early origin
15 (perhaps even earlier than the
Japanese), and shows an intermittent growth thereafter, there is no
dramatically distinct phase of their emergence. But the eighties and the
nineties (until 1996) may be seen as consolidation through profit and rents.
Corruption Has Suddenly become Dysfunctional
The question that naturally arises is why is the Chinese system so actively
and purposefully coming down on corruption today, when over the last
couple of decades it not only turned a blind eye, but also may have actively
encouraged the same? The answer lies in the returns to corruption, which
have come down with growth and maturity of the economy, and the
creation of a now numerous class of capitalists. Corruption which was
yesterday functional to the accumulation and capitalist development is
today not as the economy moves to a higher level of development wherein
further corruption would mean eating into each other's profits. What was
observed in the US in the twenties when corruption was finally tackled,
happens today in China but a lot more suddenly.
If freedom from corruption and a legal basis for commercial interaction is
treated as a good, its consumption by the masses (non-participating in
corruption) is now possible, since the incomes of the masses are above that
minimal level upon they can resist corruption. Given the extreme equality of
Chinese income distribution, that transformation is sudden. In white goods
and telephones the growth in consumption has been stupendous for the
same reason. The very high growth rate of the economy is another aspect
of the same phenomenon, since that high growth rate is itself inter alia a
result of the equality of income distribution.
                                       
15 Even if we keep aside the early modern industrialists like Dwarkanath Tagore
and others c.1860-70, whose valiant efforts fizzled out due to a hostile colonial
state, there were others like Tata and Birla who came in a few decades later.
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Transformation Success is Due to Endowments
The big question is why despite this massive corruption there has been no
governance failure in the functional sense - i.e. a failure leading to the
slowing down of the transformation? To answer that question is to explain
the late industrialisation of East Asia, and this report is not the place for it
16.
Suffice it is to say that all of East Asia grew very rapidly because of land
reform that were carried out in South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand (less
critical since land is more plentiful) and in China and Vietnam (both under
communist rule). Such reform released the home market constraint.
And to Export Oriented Policies
Additionally, pursuit of export led growth (China since the late seventies
and Vietnam later) to overcome the foreign exchange constraint and to add
to demand were the keys. Successful economic transformation has
therefore nothing to do with good corruption free governance as is the
general belief, but is necessarily about getting the initial conditions
(essentially economic) right, if need be through political action. It is
certainly not caused by culture and such other sociological factors including
the tautological 'work ethic'. The work ethic itself would have been the
result of success in the economic task of transformation
17. The essential
initial condition is really that endowments are there with the majority of
people for them to be able to participate in the market as producers and
workers, and hence as consumers. All other aspects are really secondary or
'endogenous' to the process of transformation itself -work ethic life style,
having entrepreneurial firms, technological development etc. This is not to
deny some autonomousness to large firms, the state and others to via
strategic investments in areas of market failure to speed up the
transformation process.
Rents Become Capital in China
The vast impetus to growth in China following from the relaxation, or non-
existence of the home market constraint, and the pursuit of export led
                                       
16 See Morris, S. (1997) for the argument that export led growth is not laissez
faire, but is the purposeful, promotion of both import substitution and export
promotion at the same time, though inter alia a highly undervalued currency.
Earlier economists like Lall (1994), Datta Chaudhury (1981), Alam Shahid
(1989), Amsden (1989) had argued that the states' direction, and active
involvement were imp[ortant.
17 Who would have talked about 'Confucian work ethic' in the twenties after a
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growth means that rents have a high probability of being invested, and
thus, that surplus though rent in origin becomes capital and not directly
unproductive activities (DUPs), as they do in economies like India, with
severe demand constraints. At investment rates of 40% plus
18 and growth
rates of 10% plus (till the recent 'slow down' to 7.5%) all sources of surplus
including those illegal have the functionality of speeding up the
transformation process because they are invested. When investments in
India are as low as 26-28% with a marginal savings rate close to 40% but
average around 25 to 27%, the economy is demand rather than savings
constrained. So the problem in India is not rents per se, but that so little of
it is invested within the economy. Not only that, so little of even profits may
be invested given the current strangle hold of conservative macroeconomic
policy. Capital flight and avoidable waste in DUPs and other activities
emerge to bring about the current 'equilibrium', and that creates its own
ethos of a lazy rent seeking and rent wasting economy.
BOX: THOUSANDS OF OFFICIALS PUNISHED IN CHINA'S ANTI-
CORRUPTION PURGE
Over the past weeks, Hong Kong and Guangdong-based newspapers have
documented the exposure of an elaborate smuggling operation last year in the
Special Economic Zone of Xiamen, located in China's Fujian province directly
across from Taiwan. Named Major Case 4-20, it is being touted as the largest
corruption scandal since the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China.
At the centre of the accusations is the Yuanhua or Fairwell Group, a consortium of
real estate and property development companies owned by Lai Changxing, one of
                                       
18 Doubts have been raised about the stability of the Chinese banking system.
In comparison to that of most other countries they seem to be so streched that
they could come collapsing like a house of cards. If growth slows down to less
than 5% then the problems of the banking system would have to be sorted
out. What is generally not known is that late industrialisation because it offers
the  scope to grow very rapidly also allows higher debt equity ratios and
heigher proportions of borrowed capital to own capital, without increasing
bankruptcy risk. This is because few industries face fundamental uncertainity.
And with a strong state  even that residual risk can be minimised. China is
merely following in the footsteps of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, of high
financial repression of the economy. That strategy is today functional to the
Chinese economy. It is entirely incompatible with convertibility on the capital
account. South Korea, Taiwan  and Thailand had opened themselves on the
capital account in the nineties. That was the real cause of the currency crisis,
since Japan in an earlier period had pulled through this 'risky' financial strategy
to great advantage by delaying its convertibility till well after its complete
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the richest entrepreneurs in Xiamen. Before being closed down, with its assets
confiscated, Fairwell was in the process of constructing an 88-storey skyscraper
and a two tower, 30-storey international hotel. The company also owned Xiamen's
soccer team, a theme park that is one of Xiamen's major tourist attractions and the
exclusive Red Mansion resort that was frequented by leading military officers and
the local political elite.
Utilising a network of contacts in Hong Kong, Taiwan and in the Xiamen and
Fujian governments, Lai Changxing organised the shipment of goods such as oil
and petroleum products, rubber, semiconductors, cigarettes, mobile phones and
luxury cars, avoiding payment of import duties and tariffs. An estimated $US9.5
billion of goods were smuggled into China over the course of several years,
unloaded at a Fairwell dock in the port of Xiamen and sold throughout Fujian
province at a lucrative profit. Police and customs officials protected the racket's
activities.
Since an official investigation began late last August, all government and party
officials in Fujian province have been banned from leaving China. At least one trial
has already taken place. Those alleged to have been on Fairwell's payroll include
Lan Fu, Xiamen's vice-mayor in charge of foreign trading and security; most of the
leaders of the Xiamen Communist Party branch; the deputy chief of the Fujian
police; the chief of police in Fujian's capital of Fuzhou; the heads of Xiamen's
Customs, Security and Telecommunications bureaus; and the Xiamen branch
managers of China's three largest banks. A vice-governor of Fujian may also face
allegations.
More than 150 other senior officials in Xiamen have been detained. Hundreds of
police, military and customs personnel have been questioned. Also implicated is Xu
Ganlu, a former head of security in Xiamen who was promoted in 1996 to director
of the Exit and Entry Administration, one of the highest posts in the Ministry for
Public Security. He has been placed under house arrest.
On Wednesday, a spokesman for the Chinese government denied reports by senior
Washington Post journalist John Pomfret that Fujian's largest state-owned import-
export corporation, China (Fujian) Trade Holdings, and its former head Lin
Youfang, were involved. Lin Youfang is the wife of the Beijing Communist party
boss Jia Qinglin, one of the most powerful political figures in China. Before
moving to Beijing in 1997 he was Communist party secretary in Fujian.
He sits on the 22-member Politbureau, is a close confidante of President Jiang
Zemin and opened the PRC's 50th anniversary celebration last October 1. Last
Thursday, Lin Youfang made an unprecedented appearance on state television to
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The Chinese government has also denied allegations of involvement by relatives of
General Liu Huaqing, a former Politbureau member and currently the vice-
chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission.
According to the most recent information in the Guangzhou Daily, some 400 anti-
graft police, headed by China's top anti-corruption prosecutor Liu Liying, are
investigating the case. The newspaper reported on January 22 that "as
investigators dig deeper and deeper, they find not only more people involved but
people at a higher level of government". The investigation has extended from
Xiamen to Fuzhou and another major city, Zhangzhou.
The lurid details about the goings-on in Xiamen put flesh and blood on a
staggering statistic released on January 12 by Wei Jianxing, the head of the
Chinese regime's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. In the last 12
months over 130,000 cases of official corruption have been investigated and more
than 132,000 government and Communist party officials punished, including 17
ministers.
The crackdown was signaled in December 1998 with the beginning of "The Three
Stresses" campaign, consisting of the upholding of state ideology or one-party rule;
obedience to the central government; and combating corruption. Extended across
the country last June, the campaign demanded that all government officials and
managers of state-owned firms attend a series of day-long criticism sessions in
which lower functionaries were encouraged to denounce the conduct of their
superiors.
The result of the "Three Stresses" was a dramatic intensification in corruption
investigations in the second half of 1999. China's public prosecutors office had
reported that in the first half of the year it had investigated corruption allegations
against 1,000 Communist party and government officials, 3,466 judiciary officials,
1,769 financial officials and 7,886 managers of state-owned enterprises—a total of
around 14,000 individuals.
As well as Fujian, crackdowns have taken place in the coastal provinces of
Guangdong, Hainan, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Liaoning and the Beijing and
Shanghai municipalities—that is, in most of China's key economic regions. As well
as action against smuggling rings and bribe-taking by government officials,
national campaigns were conducted last year against foreign exchange fraud, the
manipulation of prices, abuse of police power, interference by local authorities in
the courts and the misuse of public construction funds. As a result, thousands of
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The purge within the government is being directed from the highest level. President
Jiang Zemin initiated the "Three Stresses" campaign and Premier Zhu Rongji has
made numerous speeches denouncing corruption as an obstacle to the development
of China's economy and entry into the World Trade Organisation. Last August, the
national auditor general brought down a report that declared $US14.2 billion in
taxation revenue—over 20 percent of the budget—had been misappropriated by
government officials and that action had to be taken to recover it.
With the New Year, there is every sign the campaign is being escalated. The main
Communist Party organ, the Peoples Daily, featured a four-part series from
January 10-14 on the struggle for "clean government," which included a litany of
abuses by officials and the actions against it by the central authorities.
At a meeting of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection on January 12-
14, unit head Wei Jianxing unveiled new anti-corruption laws banning government
officials accepting gifts or employing members of their family within areas under
their administration. He stated: "In a market economy officials need to be
conscious of the separation between public and private affairs".
Addressing the meeting on January 14, Jiang Zemin declared: "All party members
should keep a clear mind about this: there is danger ahead if party control and
discipline are slack". He described the key reason for corruption as "party
organisation and leadership is lax in a great number of regions and units". He
stated that: "No matter who it is, no matter how high the post, those who deserve
punishment will be punished... There will be absolutely no leniency".
Corruption and capitalism
Describing the initial restoration of capitalism in his valuable work The Deng
Xiaoping Era, author Maurice Meisner noted: "By the mid-1980s Deng Xiaoping's
much celebrated market reforms had produced a capitalist economy that revolved
around the use of political power for personal profit. That it was an economic
system based on official corruption was hardly a secret in Chinese society".
With the legitimisation of private property, by the end of the 1980s entire networks
of regional and local bureaucratic patronage emerged, especially in the eastern
coastal regions that were attracting substantial foreign direct investment. What has
been revealed about the Xiamen Special Economic Zone is by no means an isolated
occurrence. The ability to make profit in China has in large measure depended
upon the necessary political connections or quanxi. A characteristic shared by
many of China's private entrepreneurs is that they, or their fathers, were leading
Stalinist officials who acquired their initial private wealth through the plunder of
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Jiang's remarks about "danger ahead" points to what is without question a
consideration in the corruption purge: the sensitivity of the Beijing regime to the
widespread alienation among the working class and peasant masses. The all-
pervasive corruption and gross social inequality is a major social grievance among
the Chinese working people. It was one of the central causes of the 1989
Tiananmen Square protests and one of the appeals of the banned Falun Gong
movement to ordinary people has been its denunciations of the loss of morality in
society—an indirect criticism of the regime.
Social tensions are now far more explosive than 11 years ago. Last year alone
some 60,000 protests took place over unpaid wages and pensions, excessive
taxation and other official abuses of authority. In a January 24 report by the Hong
Kong Standard, the director of Public Security in Guangdong, Chen Shaoji,
described massive protests across the province last year, triggered by widespread
bank failures and a series of related corruption scandals. He described 1999 as
"the most difficult period since we implemented the open-door policy [in 1979]".
Beijing is also using the corruption scandals to strengthen its control over the
regions. With the international experiences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and
the Soviet Union in mind, Beijing has sought to reverse the relative regional
autonomy from the central government that developed in the 1990s and end the
existence of local power bases.
In 1998 the Peoples Liberation Army was ordered to divest itself of its considerable
and highly regionalised business activities. In the same year the government of
Guangdong was almost totally purged and replaced with figures selected by
Beijing. One aspect of the current corruption purge, as in the case of the Falun
Gong crackdown, is the central government's assertion of control over the
provinces and state apparatus and the elimination of any potential rival.
The purpose of the crackdown on corruption, however, goes beyond an attempt to
forestall social discontent and to maintain a strong central government. Economic
factors are also in play. One of most significant social changes in China is that,
two decades after the first free market reforms, a definable class of capitalists has
emerged that is no longer dependent upon bureaucratic position for its
accumulation of wealth. It now holds ownership of considerable productive and
financial capital in the form of property, shares and private businesses.
Weighed against the local networks of politically-sponsored smugglers, black
marketers and extortionists, are the interests of China's major domestic companies.
While still euphemistically called state-owned enterprises, they are in fact share-
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Eight of them rank in the Fortune magazine 500 largest corporations in the world
and Chinese oil and steel companies are preparing to list on Wall Street. Also
growing rapidly in economic and political clout are the thousands of privately
owned companies that now have equal legal status to state-owned companies and
can gain export-import licenses.
Oil provides one example of the conflict of interests. It is estimated that 42 million
barrels of oil were smuggled into China during 1998 and sold at lower prices than
those charged by the dominant oil corporations, under conditions of economic
deflation and falling corporate profits. Similar situations could be cited for
virtually all commodities. The smuggling crackdown resulted in government
revenue from import duties increasing by 78 percent in 1999 and unquestionably
contributed to the rise in profitability for numbers of Chinese companies.
Pressure to control the corruption of government officials is also coming from
transnational corporations and Western governments. With China's impending
entry into the World Trade Organisation and the slashing of tariffs and other trade
barriers, foreign capital will be able to operate with unprecedented freedom in the
domestic economy. As with the attack on "crony capitalism" in other parts of Asia,
transnational companies will not tolerate the obstacles placed in their way by
having to pay-off tier after tier of bureaucracy to get their products into the market.
The national regime in Beijing is attempting a transition from being the highest
level of a vast Stalinist bureaucratic stratum into being the efficient instrument of a
Chinese capitalist class and international investors. In the process, it is being
forced to undermine layers of the bureaucracy beneath it and millions of officials
are losing access to long-held privileges, generating frictions and tensions.
James Conachy
1 February 2000
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